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Genetic discrimination and mental illness:
a case report
Josephine G Wong and Felice Lieh-Mak Department of Psychiatry, The University of Hong Kong
Abstract
With advances in genetic technology, there are
increasing concerns about the way in which genetic
information may be abused, particularly in people at
increased genetic risk of developing certain disorders.
In a recent case in Hong Kong, the court ruled that it
was unlawful for the civil service to discriminate in
employment, for the sake of public safety, against
people with a family history of mental illness. The
plaintiVs showed no signs of any mental health
problems and no genetic testing was performed. This
was the first case concerning genetic discrimination in
common law jurisdictions, therefore the court’s
judgment has implications for how genetic
discrimination cases may be considered in the future.
The court considered it inappropriate to apply
population statistics or lifetime risks to individuals
while examining fitness for work. It recommended an
individualised assessment of specific risks within the
job, relative to other risks posed by that workplace.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:393–397)
Keywords: Schizophrenia; employment; prejudice; genet-
ics
Introduction
Genetic discrimination is discrimination against an
individual or his or her relatives because of real or
perceived (emphasis added) diVerences from the
ideal genome.1 With a surge of interest in genetic
research, the development of new technologies and
completion of the sequencing of the human
genome, we are now able to find out, through
genetic testing, genetic information about not only
the individual who took the test, but also about his
or her family members. Genetic information clearly
provides benefits: for example, in giving infor-
mation about risk of future disease, disability and
early death; and in enabling early detection and
treatment of disorders. There is widespread con-
cern, however, both at public policy level2 and at an
individual level3–5 about misuse of this information
as grounds for discrimination, for example in
employment, access to health care or access to
insurance. People may be discouraged from obtain-
ing genetic information that could bring health
benefits to themselves and their families because of
fear about the misuse of test results or inferences
drawn from the fact that a test was sought. Genetic
discrimination in the workplace has attracted
particular attention recently.6 Many states in the
United States have introduced legislation to protect
their citizens against genetic discrimination,7 and
the White House has endorsed regulations against
genetic discrimination in federal jobs.8
We report a case in which the discrimination was
based on a “perceived” deviation from the ideal
genome, when in fact no abnormal genes were
identified. Because of concerns about public safety,
asymptomatic individuals with no past history of
mental disturbance were denied employment in the
“disciplined forces” in Hong Kong, (members of
the public service responsible for law enforcement
or for save and rescue, for example the police, cus-
toms and excise oYcers, members of the fire serv-
ice and ambulance service) on the basis of a history
of schizophrenia in a first degree relative. The judg-
ment of the court in this case outlines general prin-
ciples and the line of reasoning to be followed when
considering such a case. These principles are
relevant for similar cases in the future.
Genetics of schizophrenia
There is no doubt that genetics is important in the
aetiology of schizophrenia. Family studies9 have
revealed that the relatives of aVected individuals are
at a higher risk of schizophrenia than the general
population (about 1% worldwide), and the risk is a
function of the degree of genetic relatedness to the
proband. The highest risks, of 46% and 48%, are
found in the oVspring of two schizophrenic parents
and the co-twins of aVected identical twins respec-
tively, and this declines to a rate of 2% for third
degree relatives (for example cousins). Findings
from twin studies and adoption studies10 similarly
point to the importance of genetic influences in the
aetiology of schizophrenia, while acknowledging
that environmental factors also play a role. Schizo-
phrenia appears to be a polygenic multifactorial
disease. It has been estimated that about 70% of the
variation in the liability to develop schizophrenia is
accounted for by genes, with the remaining 30% of
variation being explained by the environment.11
Linkage and association studies have so far not
clearly localised any chromosomal region or
specific gene,12 and the mode of inheritance
remains unknown. Although a genetic test is avail-
able for some single gene disorders, for example,
Huntington’s disease, there is currently no genetic
test for schizophrenia.
Facts of the case13
The plaintiVs were three young men who had
applied for jobs in the Hong Kong civil service. K
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and Y applied for jobs in the Fire Services Depart-
ment (FSD) as an ambulance man and a fireman
respectively. Both of them were rejected. W had
been oVered a job with the Customs and Excise
Department (CED), but his employment was
terminated after a medical examination that
included obtaining information about serious
illnesses in the applicant’s family. In each of these
cases, refusal or termination of employment was
due to a history of mental illness, namely
schizophrenia, in a parent. The plaintiVs, through
the Equal Opportunities Commission, sued the
Secretary of Justice for and on behalf of the Fire
Services Department and Customs and Excise
Department of Hong Kong. The three claims were
heard together in the District Court of Hong Kong
in September, 2000. Each of the three claims were
begun under the Disability Discrimination Ordi-
nance,14 claiming that the defendant had commit-
ted an act of discrimination in employment
contrary to the part III of the ordinance which pro-
hibits discrimination in employment against per-
sons with a disability or persons with an associate
with a disability.
Up till 1997, the disciplined forces in Hong Kong
had always had the policy that first degree relatives
of persons with mental disorder of a hereditary
nature (for example schizophrenia and bipolar
aVective disorder) would be excluded from jobs in
those departments.15 If candidates had a family his-
tory of such mental disorders, they would be
declared unfit by the medical board examining
them. When the Disability Discrimination Ordi-
nance came into eVect in December 1996, a Task
Force on Mental Requirement of Disciplinary
Forces issued revised guidelines to the Medical
Examination Board, emphasising that there should
not be discrimination against the mentally ill and
that the policy of excluding people with mentally ill
first degree relatives should be relaxed.16 It appears
the defendants did not change their recruitment
policy despite these revised guidelines.
ARGUMENTS FROM THE DEFENCE
The defence cited public safety as their grounds for
denying employment to the plaintiVs. Anything that
tends to increase the risk to the safety of fellow
employees or members of the public is relevant to
the plaintiVs’ ability to carry out the inherent
requirement of their respective employment. A
child of a person with schizophrenia has a 13% risk
of developing schizophrenia, compared to a one per
cent risk in the general population.17 The mother of
K and the mother of W suVer from schizophrenia,
while Y’s late father had a mental illness, which, at
the time of his death, was diagnosed as schizophre-
nia. This was the reason for refusing or terminating
each of the plaintiVs’ employment. Under the Dis-
ability Discrimination Ordinance of Hong Kong, it
is unlawful, subject to a number of statutory excep-
tions, to discriminate against a person with a
disability or a person with an associate with a
disability by refusing to oVer that person employ-
ment. The defence relied on one of these statutory
exceptions: where the person with the disability (or
with an associate with the disability) is unable to
carry out the “inherent requirements of the
particular employment” (section 12(2)). Safety to
the public and fellow employees was cited as an
inherent requirement of the jobs concerned. The
defence suggested that the nature of the jobs and
the duties of the respective departments put
employees in a highly stressful situation, thus
further increasing the risk of onset of schizophre-
nia. During the period of onset of schizophrenia,
the individual may pose a risk to the safety of other
employees and to the general public.
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNTERARGUMENTS
There was some controversy about the actual diag-
nosis of Y’s father, because he did not have typical
clinical features of schizophrenia. The second
author, one of the expert witnesses for the plaintiVs,
examined the medical records of Y’s father and
suggested that he actually suVered from a delu-
sional disorder. This revised diagnosis was accepted
by the court. Delusional disorder is a rare disorder
compared to schizophrenia, with a later age of
onset. So far there is no evidence that it is
hereditary.
There was no argument about the diagnosis of
schizophrenia in the respective parents of K and W.
As outlined earlier, genes undoubtedly play an
important part in the aetiology of schizophrenia,
but the mode of inheritance of familial schizophre-
nia is unknown. It is not possible to make a precise
prediction of individual risks for schizophrenia
because schizophrenia is not a single gene disorder.
In fact, schizophrenia is likely to result from the
combined eVect of many genes and environmental
factors. The figure of 13% risk of developing
schizophrenia if one parent had the disorder (in
contrast to a population risk of one per cent) can
only be a starting point in the assessment of risk in
any individual.
The plaintiVs had two world renowned psychiat-
ric geneticists, Professor I I Gottesman and Profes-
sor P McGuYn as expert witnesses. They described
two methods of predicting individual risk in
vulnerable individuals.18 The “empirical risk pre-
diction” takes into account the severity of illness in
the sick parent and the psychological characteristics
of the other parent; while the “multifactorial com-
puterised risk model” takes into account other
members of the pedigree in addition to the parent
who is mentally ill, giving “credit” for healthy
members and “debit” for every sick relative.
Furthermore, the individual risk needs to be
adjusted for the age of the person, since the risk gets
lower as a person “survives” longer into the at-risk
period without development of schizophrenia. With
such adjustments, the risks of K and W were
reduced to 5.4% (v 0.8% of a random male in the
general population matched for age). In addition,
the plaintiVs were each individually examined
clinically. The psychiatric examination showed no
psychiatric symptoms or prodromal symptoms,
which could precede onset of schizophrenia by a
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period of time. For this reason, the individual risk of
developing schizophrenia in each plaintiV was
reduced to well below 5%. There was no evidence,
contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, that the
occupations of fireman, ambulance man, or cus-
toms oYcer increase the risk of developing schizo-
phrenia.
Even if there is an elevated risk of developing
schizophrenia, there should be a further step in
quantifying the risk of threat to public safety. It is
important to point out that public safety would only
be threatened if the schizophrenic illness were acute
in onset, therefore giving no time for detection of
the mental disorder and no opportunity to take the
necessary action which may include referral for
medical attention, and a move to a less stressful job,
as well as ongoing monitoring of and support for
the patient. Empirical findings indicate that acute
onset schizophrenia (developing over days or
weeks) is in fact relatively rare.19 Possible adverse
consequences of the onset of schizophrenia include
two broad aspects: violent behaviour and a failure
to perform a work duty. The risk of failure to
perform a work duty is not clear since there is no
previous research in this area in the context of the
jobs in question. The defence cited studies examin-
ing the risk of violence in schizophrenia.20–22 The
consensus from the literature is that schizophrenia
is associated with a slight excess of violence when
compared to non-schizophrenia, and the violence is
almost exclusively minor. Main contributors to the
risk of violence are in fact those recognised in non-
schizophrenic people, for example, past history of
violence and substance abuse.23 These risk factors
were not present in the plaintiVs. In addition, the
studies on dangerousness all relate to established
diagnoses of schizophrenia whereas here we are
only concerned with dangerousness at the onset of
the illness. It would be reasonable to expect that the
risk of violence is lower at the onset period. Taking
all these consideration into account, the estimated
risk of dangerousness in the plaintiVs was further
reduced to 0.4%.
An absolute figure of 0.4% has little meaning
unless compared to risks that are deemed accept-
able in the specific job. The judge cited Gibson J of
the Federal Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney
General) v Thwaites (1994) FC 38,24: “In any par-
ticular situation, one must determine when risks are
significant and thus unacceptable by identifying the
nature and quantum of other risks that are tolerated
as acceptable in that particular work environment”.
The defendant’s policy only excluded people with a
family history of mental disorder in first degree
relatives, not in second degree relatives. Second
degree relatives have an average risk of 6% of
developing schizophrenia. This is higher than the
5.4% risk estimated in K and W when adjusted for
age. In addition, the FSD and CED do not require
that onset of mental illness in family members be
reported after a person has been recruited. The
conclusion was that degrees of risk comparable to
K’s and W’s individualised risks are already
tolerated by the FSD and CED. Moreover, around
89% of all persons suVering from schizophrenia
will have neither parent ill with schizophrenia.
Therefore, the magnitude of risk faced by the FSD
and CED would not be significantly diminished by
discriminating against individuals with first degree
relatives with schizophrenia.
COURT DECISION
The court ruled that discrimination against Y was
unlawful since there was no evidence that delu-
sional disorder, from which Y’s late father suVered,
was a hereditary disorder. Discrimination against K
and W was also ruled unlawful since K’s and W’s
genetic liability to develop schizophrenia, when
weighed with the possible consequences if that risk
occurred, did not present a real risk to safety at their
places of employment. They were therefore judged
to be able to carry out that inherent requirement of
the job. At the invitation of the defence, the court
considered how an employer might lawfully screen
for vulnerability to schizophrenia in a job applicant.
Based on the individual assessment of genetic risk
undertaken for the plaintiVs, schizophrenia in any
first degree relative of a job applicant, on its own,
would not pose a real risk to the applicant. They
should therefore not be excluded from employment
in the disciplined forces. Further enquiry about risk
is only warranted if the genetic liability is much
higher than it is for a first degree relative, for exam-
ple if there were more than one close relative with a
history of schizophrenia. In any case, an individual
assessment of the applicant’s genetic risk must be
made, with an examination for prodromal signs,
taking into account the subtype of schizophrenia in
the relative and the age of the applicant. The nature
and magnitude of the risk involved should be
examined in order to assess whether it posed a real
risk in the job in question, relative to other risks
tolerated in that workplace. The plaintiVs were each
awarded damages between Hong Kong $775000
(about £68,000) and over $1 million (about
£88,000), plus costs.
Discussion
Recent advances in genetic technologies and the
possibility of identifying a wide range of genetic
abnormalities have raised much concern about
genetic discrimination. In this case, no genetic test-
ing was performed, and no abnormal genotype had
been identified in the plaintiVs. In fact, no genetic
testing is possible for schizophrenia since the
precise mechanism by which schizophrenia is
inherited is unknown, and the abnormal genes that
confer vulnerability to schizophrenia have not yet
been identified. Moreover, even if the molecular
genetic basis of schizophrenia was better under-
stood, it is unlikely that individual risk prediction
would ever be better than about 50% since mono-
zygotic twins are discordant for schizophrenia
about 50% of the time.21 The discrimination in
employment was the result of “perceived” (rather
than real) diVerences from the ideal genome
because of a history of schizophrenia in a first
degree relative. Having said that, this important
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case illustrates some important general principles
in considering when unlawful genetic discrimina-
tion occurs in employment, whether the discrimi-
nation is based on perceived (when genetic status
was inferred from a family history) or real
diVerences (when genetic testing had revealed an
abnormal gene) from the ideal genome. First, there
should be an individualised estimation of the risk of
the person developing the disorder. This individu-
alised estimation should take into account the role
of environmental factors, the age of the person and
his or her current health status. Equally important
is a consideration of the specific nature of the
disability, and whether there is a risk that the indi-
vidual would, as a result of the disability, fail to
carry out an inherent requirement of the job in
question. Furthermore, we need to ascertain the
magnitude of this risk and the seriousness of the
consequences if this risk were to be realised, taking
into account the possibility of preventive measures
that could be taken to avoid harm. Whether the
increased risk is significant is determined by
comparing it with other risks that the employer is
willing to accept. Clearly, public safety is an impor-
tant legitimate concern in recruiting staV for the
disciplined forces, especially as some of them may
have access to firearms. The court, by outlining as
above, a process of pre-employment screening for
individuals who are genetically liable to develop
schizophrenia, recognised that public safety might
override an individual’s right to freedom from dis-
crimination in employment in certain specified
situations. The general principles and line of
reasoning used by the court set a standard for such
risk assessment.
The case was considered in a very “clinical”
manner, citing figures from empirical studies with
calculations of individualised risks based on clinical
data. It is important, however, to consider the social
and cultural context within which this case arose.
On the 1st of November 1997, after the job
applications of Y and W had been refused and while
K’s application was still pending, a tragic event
occurred at a local police station. A police oYcer,
acting under a delusion that a detainee, under his
guard, was a ghost and about to attack him, shot the
detainee with his service revolver, killing him. The
oYcer was afterwards diagnosed as schizophrenic.
A sibling of this police oYcer had been diagnosed
as schizophrenic six months previously. Prior to the
tragic incident, there had been no warning signs at
work that his mental state was worsening. The
decisions to reject the plaintiVs were made when
this piece of news was fresh in the minds of those
concerned and among the people of Hong Kong.
Ironically, the recruitment policy of the police force
would not have prevented the recruitment of the
police oYcer in this case. The oYcer’s brother
became ill after the oYcer joined the force, and
there was no requirement to report development of
mental illness in a family member after a person
was in employment.
Taking a broader view, stigmatisation of people
with mental disorders and their families is
widespread.25–27 The general public often perceives
people with schizophrenia to be unpredictable and
dangerous.28 This perception is not supported by
the empirical evidence arising from the examina-
tion of the risk of serious violence in people with
schizophrenia. There is a need for wide public edu-
cation and debate on this issue. Taylor and Gunn,29
distinguished forensic psychiatrists from the UK,
have stated: “Psychiatrists might help themselves
and their patients by taking an information-based
but higher profile in public and political debate to
counter popular and stigmatising mythologies
about people with mental disorder. People with
mental illness account for a minute (emphasis
added) amount of risk to the general public . . ..”
Similarly, Wallace, et al from Australia concluded
from their study on serious criminal oVending and
mental disorder that the risk of a serious crime
being committed by someone with a major mental
illness is small and “does not justify subjecting
them, as a group, to either increased institutional
containment or greater coercion”.30 More specific
examinations of attitudes towards mental illness in
Chinese communities suggest that these communi-
ties are less accepting of mentally ill people, and
that stigma is often attached to the family as a
whole.31 In a detailed examination of mental health
care in China, Pearson wrote: “There is widespread
belief that mental illness is a punishment for the
ancestors’ misdeeds visited on the present genera-
tion, eVectively shaming several generations of the
family simultaneously. The ‘taint’ associated with
mental illness is so strong that it extends beyond the
aVected person, for instance with regard to the
issue of marriage”.32 The burden of shame and guilt
carried by the family intensifies the stigma, and
often leads to eVorts to concealing mental illness in
a family member. In many countries recently, cam-
paigns have been launched to combat stigmatisa-
tion of mental illnesses.33 This case, which was
widely reported locally, sends a clear and unam-
biguous message to the public that discrimination
against people with psychiatric disorders and
against their families is unlawful, unnecessary and
inappropriate.
Josephine G Wong,MA,MRCPsych, is Assistant Pro-
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